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ABSTRACT 
 
While product market choices were central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, the 
integration of financial markets makes the choice of capital markets an equally important 
strategic decision.  We advance a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market 
choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market.  Based on a sample of 103 and 99 foreign 
IPOs in the US and UK respectively during the period 2002-2006, we find that internal 
governance characteristics (founder CEO, executive incentives, and board independence) and 
external network characteristics (prestigious underwriters, degree of venture capitalist 
syndication, and board interlocks) are significant predictors of foreign capital market choice by 
IPO firms. Our results suggest foreign IPO firms select a host market where its governance 
characteristics and third party affiliations fit the host market’s institutional environment.  The 
basis for evaluating such fit is the extent to which firm attributes and characteristics meet 
legitimacy standards in host markets.  Thus, differences in internal governance characteristics 
and external ties are associated with strategic capital market choices such that increased fit 
results in higher likelihood of choosing one market over another.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words:  Corporate Governance, Institutional Theory, IPO.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Strategic decisions essentially relate to issues of domain selection and domain navigation 
(Bourgeois, 1980).  Therefore, not surprisingly, much of the research in the strategic 
management area surrounds the product market choices made by firms.  Certainly, the initial 
choice of the product market domain is one of the most important decisions that a firm will 
make.  However, firms often need external financial resources in order to capitalize on growth 
opportunities provided by their chosen product markets.  Hence, a firm’s initial choice of a 
capital market to make its first public equity offer is an equally important domain choice 
decision for a variety of reasons.  An initial public offering (IPO) of equity represents a critical 
stage of development, which is often referred to as the “re-birth” or “re-start” of the organization 
(Finkle, 1998: 6).  Organization theorists emphasize the importance of the IPO threshold and the 
infusion of funds from the sale of equity because it represents a significant shift in the strategic 
choices open to the firm (Certo et al., 2001).  As Fama and French (2004, p: 229) explain: “It is 
the point of entry that gives firms expanded access to equity capital, allowing them to emerge 
and grow.”  Therefore, an analysis of factors that affect a firm’s choice of capital markets is of 
crucial importance for better understanding of the strategic dynamics of firms.   
Historically firms opting to ‘go public’ were, by and large, confined by legal reasons to 
offer their shares only on the exchanges of their country of origin.  However, the integration of 
international capital markets has greatly expanded the choices available to firms seeking equity 
capital.  For example, in recent years many firms which are already publicly listed in their home 
exchanges have ‘cross-listed’ in order to offer their shares in foreign capital markets.  However, 
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there is an emerging class of firms that choose to forego their domestic stock market entirely and 
make their initial public offering in a foreign market.  There has been very little prior research on 
why these firms choose to forego their domestic capital markets or how they choose among 
foreign capital markets.  In recent years, scholars have explored the decision IPO firms face 
when choosing between domestic stock exchanges (Bruton and Prasad, 1997), and the choice 
between a domestic or a foreign public offering (Ding, Nowak, and Zhang, 2009, Blass and 
Yafeh, 2001).  Given that firms undertaking an IPO can choose among multiple foreign markets, 
what is conspicuously missing is an investigation of the institutional and firm-level factors that 
influence the choice between foreign capital markets.  The focus of this paper is on 
understanding this strategic choice.   
Today the vast majority of firms that decide to make their initial public offering outside 
their country do so by listing their stocks in either New York or London.  What is unclear, is how 
foreign firms choose among overseas exchanges.  More specifically, why would foreign firms 
with similar characteristics such as size, age, industry affiliation, country of origin, etc. make 
very different choices regarding where to undertake their IPO?  Scholars in finance focus mainly 
on issues related to cost of capital associated with foreign listings (Blass and Yafeh, 2001; 
Pagano et al., 2002) as the main driver of the firm’s choice of a foreign stock exchange.  This 
research suggests that this choice may have important implications in terms of visibility and 
media recognition, ability to raise additional equity or debt, manage investor expectations, and 
conform to regulatory requirements.  These potential benefits may be sufficiently high to offset 
the costs associated with foreign listing compared to domestic share offerings, in particular for 
firms from less developed countries choosing to list in an industrialized economy.  Moreover, a 
number of studies indicate that corporate governance characteristics may play a critical strategic 
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role in improving stakeholder perceptions of foreign firms and thus reducing their cost of equity 
capital.  Coffee (2002) suggests that, by adhering to high governance standards, foreign firms 
may substantially reduce their cost of equity in an overseas market compared to their peers that 
do not follow good governance practices.  Although making an advance in terms of linking 
foreign IPO firm’s performance with its governance characteristics, this research still does not 
provide answer to the question, “What characteristics of the firm drive their choice of a particular 
listing market in the first place?”   
More recent organizational perspective on comparative corporate governance (e.g., 
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel and Jackson, 2008) suggest that firm-
level governance characteristics may be institutionally embedded.  Therefore, the firm’s cost of 
capital may depend on institutional context within which the firm operates and the extent of their 
conformity to the legitimized norms and expectations prevailing in that market.  However, this 
research does not consider possible choices between different national institutional 
environments, and this makes a fast growing population of foreign IPOs a particularly interesting 
laboratory for further theory building. 
Our objective in this paper is to develop understanding about how firms make the 
strategic choice of where to list their shares on a foreign market exchange.  More specifically, we 
seek to answer the question: “Can the firm’s governance characteristics predict whether it would 
choose New York or London for its IPO, ceteris paribus?”  We address this question by 
suggesting that the firm’s choice among foreign capital markets is mainly driven by the extent to 
which its organizational characteristics conform to the institutional features of a particular 
market.  New firms offering shares to investors in a foreign capital market clearly have to 
contend with issues of liability of foreignness (Hybels, 1995; Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer et al., 1997) 
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and liability of newness  (Certo, 2003; Singh, Tucker, and House, 1986).  In order to be 
successful in their share offering, these firms have to overcome these liabilities by attaining 
legitimacy in the foreign institutional context by conforming to the norms and expectations 
prevailing in that market (Deephouse, 1996). 
We combine corporate governance research with institutional theory to make a number of 
contributions to the fast growing strategy research on foreign IPOs.  First, we focus on the firm’s 
corporate governance characteristics, such as the extent of its “professionalization,” internal 
monitoring and managerial incentives, and consider the degree to which they are isomorphic 
with different institutional contexts.  We argue that factors affecting the firm’s conformity with 
formal national institutions, such as corporate governance regulation will affect the firm’s 
choices between various stock exchanges.  Second, given that economic action is shaped by the 
structure of social relationships, the specific networks that a firm is embedded in might also 
influence its choice of exchange.  We extend previous research by investigating institutional 
embeddedness of the firm’s external board interlocks and its association with third part certifying 
agents such as venture capitalists (VCs) and bank-underwriters.  We argue that board interlocks 
and the third party networks help a foreign IPO increase its embeddedness with informal 
institutions, and, again, they may impact its choice of foreign market.  
This study, therefore, provides theoretical and empirical insights into the impact of 
corporate governance characteristics and third part certifying agents on the foreign IPO’s choice 
of its listing destination in two capital markets with different institutional settings.  Specifically, 
we examine the contrasting contexts of the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) as 
two examples of the “common law” family of corporate governance.  The two countries differ in 
important ways that lead us to expect differences in the salience of the IPO firm’s characteristics 
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and their external networks.  This is an important contribution as IPO research has so far tended 
to imply that governance factors and third party certifying agents have a universal impact that 
applies in the same way in different institutional settings.  As such, we contribute to emerging 
attempts to integrate institutional and corporate governance research in the strategy literature 
(e.g., Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, and Jackson, 2008).  
INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. AND U.K. CAPITAL MARKETS 
Institutional theory provides an alternative explanation to firm behavior proffered by 
neoclassical economics and argues that firm behavior can be understood in terms of “preconscious 
understandings that organizational actors share, independent of their interests” (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983, p.3).  Rather than make predictions based on utilitarian (i.e., economic) bases, 
institutional theory identifies social mechanisms that explain organizational behaviors.  
Consequently, strategic decisions that fail to make rational, economic sense can be understood 
from a more socialized perspective by examining those decisions vis-à-vis key stakeholders.  So in 
addition to instrumental, economic considerations, the formulation of strategy involves the need to 
provide justifications for strategic decisions and behaviors that are considered legitimate by 
organizational stakeholders (Neilsen and Rao, 1987).  Institutions constrain firm behavior by 
communicating “rules of the game” and what is considered legitimate (Meyer and Rowen, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Suchman (1995, p. 574) argues that legitimacy is “possessed 
objectively, yet created subjectively”, suggesting that legitimacy is a socially conferred status 
resulting from evaluations by other stakeholder groups.  Thus, a firm’s legitimacy is based on the 
shared beliefs of a referent social group and socially constructed through the interaction of the firm 
and its environment.   
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Because organizations compete in dynamic environments, they often tend to imitate those 
firms that they perceive to be successful organizations.  As a result, firms adopt practices of those 
organizations that appear to be successful based on the salient properties they perceive through 
market interactions and the prevailing institutional logics that are considered legitimate by the 
institutional environment (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  When firms mimic successful firms in their 
competitive environments, organizations become identified as socially legitimated (Deephouse, 
1996, 2000; Deephouse et al., 2005).  The institutional understanding of legitimacy views 
instrumental reward as peripheral to the social construction of the belief systems that create 
audience reactions and managerial decisions (Suchman, 1995).  Consequently, social reasons in 
addition to economic considerations factor into the market choice decisions of firms.    
Institutional environments present especially important social referent to a foreign firm 
considering the strategic decision of where to make initial equity offers. Because of this we expect 
the institutional differences between the U.S. and U.K. capital markets to be predictive of market 
choice decisions made by foreign IPOs.  North (1990) specifies that formal institutions consist of 
laws and regulations, of political and economic rules and procedures, and other explicit constraints 
on behavior.  Alternatively, informal institutions consist of those unwritten, yet quite influential, 
societal norms, conventions, and values (North, 1990).  The differences in the institutional 
environments surrounding the U.S. and U.K. capital markets help to underscore the historical and 
contemporary importance of the formal regulative institutional environment in the U.S. compared 
to the informal voluntary codes in the U.K. capital market. In addition, these differences help to 
provide general perceptions of what constitutes “good governance” in these two markets, and 
explain the exchange listing decisions of foreign IPOs. This institutional argument suggests that 
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firm-level characteristics interact with institutional environments to jointly affect the strategic 
choices of firms (Deephouse, 1999) 
The institutional environment of U.K. is perhaps best described by Cain and Hopkins 
(1980, 1986) who characterized the nature of the intermingled economic, social, and political 
power centering on the City of London as “gentlemanly capitalism”. Gentlemanly capitalism is 
based on a preference for voluntary action over law and is related to a preference for “collective 
individualism” (Currie, 1979), where free agents acting collectively may seek to regulate affairs 
and develop norms and codes of practice. Gentlemanly capitalism is legitimated through the notion 
that voluntary rules and regulations should be obeyed, rather than legislatively mandated.  Being a 
gentleman formed part of the habitus of key elite groups spanning the City and government, and 
were supported by a dense network of social ties built upon the importance of trust and reputation 
within them.  Indeed, the informal institutional environment of the U.K. is such that dense social 
networks and patterns of interaction lead actors to know one another, and  reputations and social 
networks are particularly effective at governing firm behavior (Cassis, 1994; Collins, 1991; 
Kynason, 1994, 1999, 2001 2001).  Furthermore, key actors are concentrated in a geographically 
small area, which reinforces the dense social structure of strong ties (Coleman, 1988, 1990). 
The “gentlemanly capitalism” approach helps to explain why the U.K. has long tended to 
rely on a strong tradition of voluntary self-regulation in areas related to listing, takeovers, and 
accounting (Cain et al., 1986, 1987).  In recent years, this tradition has further gained in 
importance through the development of a set of codes for corporate governance, which have 
culminated in the Combined Code.  This system established corporate governance guidelines, yet 
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compliance with the U.K. “Code of Best Practice” is not mandatory1.  Firms are free to not comply 
as long as an explanation is provided for any deviation.  Supporters of comply-or-explain systems 
contend they are built upon the concept of principles, rather than strict regulation (Hubbard and 
Thornton, 2006), which allow firms the ability to modify and adapt their corporate governance 
policies to their particular needs.  
The voluntary regulative approach found in the U.K. stands in contrast to the more formal 
regulative traditions found in the U.S.   The U.S. developed an extensive body of securities and 
corporate law (i.e., ‘hard law’) at both the Federal and State levels. The most recent manifestation 
of the hard law approach found in the U.S. was the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 
2002, in which the U.S. Congress mandated new and more stringent governance regulations and 
increased the costs of non-compliance to all public firms both foreign and domestic.  Through 
legislative action, SOX required firms to put in place a number of measures intended to reduce 
conflicts and enhance the role of independent directors.  Other measures encourage the reporting 
by attorneys and audit firms, as well as establish criminal penalties for altering documents and for 
defrauding shareholders.  While SOX is just one legislative effort which mandated governance and 
heightened transparency of public firms in the U.S., it is indicative of the coercive regulative 
environment found in the U.S.   
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Information asymmetry, or differences in information between the various parties to the 
listing process, including the IPO firm, banks-underwriters, entrepreneur, and external investors 
has been the foundation of prior investigations of IPO performance (Ritter and Welch, 2002: 
1807).  Results of information asymmetry are two distinctive types of agency problems - adverse 
                                                 
1
 Similar codes of governance have been adopted in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, and Sweden 
(Hubbard & Thornton, 2006). 
 11 
selection and moral hazard.  To illustrate adverse selection agency conflict, a manager may not 
accurately reveal all he/she knows about a firm.  Moral hazard problems emerge when 
information asymmetries make it is possible for managers to shirk their duties and not act at 
maximum efficiency and effectiveness for the firm.  Because of these information asymmetries, 
there are potential agency costs when a firm experiences an IPO since managers may not reveal 
actions within the firm or do not take certain actions that maximize firm benefits (Sanders and 
Boivie, 2004). 
At IPO, investors recognize the potential impact of the agency costs associated with 
information asymmetries, and protect themselves in part through increasing the cost of raising 
equity on a public market.  However, the IPO team may use signals that allow potential investors 
to better understand the true value of the firm and the risks of agency problems which in turn can 
reduce costs of capital (Sanders and Boivie, 2004).  Within this framework, there is a growing 
body of research that is focused on signaling properties of corporate governance factors 
associated with an IPO firm.  Previous studies have recognized signaling properties of a wide 
variety of governance factors, such as founder-CEO, board independence, third party certifying 
agents (e.g., venture capitalists and underwriters), board “interlocks” etc (Beatty and Zajac, 
1994; Certo et al., 2001; 2003; Daily et al., 2005; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002).  Despite 
differences in research perspectives, these studies have one common element: they assume that 
IPO firms can reduce their cost of capital and improve stock-market performance by using “good 
governance” signals.   
Although stock market participants in the U.S. and in the U.K. share similar views on the 
factors that contribute to “good corporate governance” (e.g., board independence, transparency, 
etc.), substantial variation exists between these two common law countries in terms of corporate 
 12 
governance regulatory traditions, in particular the importance of so-called “soft law” and self-
regulatory arrangements such as codes.  The prevalence of voluntary codes in the U.K., in contrast 
to the coercive regulative environment of the U.S., prompt stock-market participants within these 
markets to place different relative weights to the roles and functions of corporate governance and 
third party certifying agents. As a result, these institutional differences impact upon expected cost 
of capital and hence the exchange listing decisions of foreign IPOs.  When a foreign firm is 
choosing between listing in the U.S. or U.K., it is more likely to choose the market where its 
characteristics are more likely to be valued.  In other words, firms are more likely to choose those 
institutional contexts with which their governance characteristics have the most conformity.   
In the following sections, we highlight how the network-based nature of the gentlemanly 
capitalism framework found in the U.K. prompt stock market participants to place more emphasis 
in the network-related aspects of corporate governance.  Conversely, in the case of the more 
coercive regulative nature of the U.S. market, we highlight how participants in the U.S. capital 
market may place greater weight on the governance characteristics consistent with the 
”professionalization” of a foreign IPO firm’s governance system.  Accordingly, we discuss how 
various internal governance characteristics of the firm as well as its external ties and resultant 
legitimacy would affect its choice of capital markets. 
Internal Governance Characteristics 
 
 The role of governance characteristics in the context of IPOs has been the subject of 
considerable research in recent years (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; Nelson, 2003).  Three 
internal governance characteristics, namely, founder CEOs, executive stock options, and board 
independence will likely affect a firm’s choice of capital markets. 
Founder CEOs 
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 In transitioning to a professionally managed firm, founder CEOs are likely to realize the 
limitations of their own knowledge and experiences, and delegate decision-making authority to 
externally hired executives and independent members of the company’s board.  Research 
indicates that newly-recruited “professional” directors often have experiences and skills that can 
augment those of founder CEOs (Ford, 1988; Willard et al., 1992), making it easier to craft an 
effective strategy for the firm’s growth.  Certo et al. (2001) suggest that the biases of the 
founders and their over-optimism with regard to venture’s success and their managerial 
capabilities could be somewhat tempered by “professional” directors who provide additional 
high-quality, firm-specific information.  However, past research clearly points to measurable 
performance differences between fast-growing companies that were founder-managed vs. 
“professionally” (i.e., non-founder) managed, using multiple accounting- and market-based 
measures of differences (Willard et al., 1992). 
 In addition to agency explanations in which “professional” boards are an important factor 
in reducing agency costs (Daily and Dalton, 1992), there are also institutional explanations for 
divergent corporate governance practices in the U.K. compared to the U.S.  Making the transition 
to life as a publicly held corporation in a new institutional environment governed by regulatory 
institutions may be especially difficult for these firms without leadership accustomed to the new 
and diverse challenges of the U.S. capital market.  U.S. investors perceive that founder CEOs of 
foreign IPOs will experience considerable difficulties adjusting to the short term performance 
expectation of U.S. investors while simultaneously adhering to the ongoing heightened 
transparency requirements imposed on U.S public firms.  Although a few studies conducted on 
samples of U.S. firms have demonstrated that founders can help IPOs improve performance 
(Nelson, 2003; Fischer and Pollock, 2004), we expect the opposite results for foreign IPOs in the 
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U.S lead by founder CEOs.  The prevailing view among scholars in the U.S. is that founder-
CEOs who take their firm public represent untested management (Wat, 1983).  Once a foreign 
IPO becomes public in the U.S., they are confronted by different laws, regulations, and press 
scrutiny.  Indeed, founder-CEOs may have been quite successful in understanding the rules and 
practices of their own country as a private firm, yet may not have the skills required to grow their 
firm while simultaneously adhering to the mandatory governance, disclosure, and transparency 
obligations associated with SOX legislation in the U.S. capital market.   
In the UK, a high level of “professionalization” has lower level of institutional 
embeddedness when compared to the US. In a network economy with strong reputation 
considerations, having an original founder still at the firm’s helm may help it to achieve relatively 
better results since reputation is easier to associate with an individual rather than a management 
team. When institutional context is more appreciative of leadership, personal charisma and the 
networks of entrepreneurs rather than individual skills and professional experience of hired 
professional managers, having a founder-CEO may present an advantage.  Indeed, previous studies 
indicate that public market investors in the U.K. are more tolerant with regard to founder control 
over listed firms. For example, Filatotchev et al. (2006) indicate that in the majority of newly listed 
firms founders continue to lead the firm either as a CEO or as a Chairman with the average founder 
ownership amounting to 26.4 percent. Other studies have found that founders of U.K. IPOs have 
strong impact on the development of their firm’s governance characteristics, such as board 
independence and selection of non-executive directors (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002). The fastest 
growing exchange in the U.K., the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), uses less stringent 
regulatory framework compared to the Main market in terms of corporate governance compliance. 
As a result, the vast majority of founder-owned entrepreneurial firms target AIM as their market of 
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choice (Filatotchev, 2006), since investors’ perceptions of a sufficient level of 
“professionalization” of an IPO firm are lower there than on the Main Market. 
Hence, if the foreign IPO wants to reduce its cost of capital by signalling its high level of 
“professionalization”, this signal would be more salient among U.S. investors than in the U.K. 
Therefore, these arguments suggest that:   
 Hypothesis 1:   Foreign IPOs led by founder CEOs are more likely to list in the 
U.K. 
 
Executive Incentives  
 Beatty and Zajac (1994:317) stress that traditional agency studies emphasize the primacy 
of incentive alignment in which  agency problems utilize monitoring mechanisms to address the 
magnitude of incentive gap. Therefore, one of the central prescriptions found in agency theory 
literature is the development of  outcome based contracts for the executive (Fama et al., 1983). 
The design of these contracts should include an appropriate incentive in terms of a compensation 
plan (Williamson, 1985).  Studies have shown that stock based compensation has a positive 
impact on stock market returns (Braga, Brickley, and Lease, 1985) as well as legitimacy 
(Sanders and Boivie, 2004).  This has prompted scholars to suggest, “corporations can and 
should increase their control over top managers by increasing the use of managerial incentives 
and monitoring by the board of directors” (Zajac and Westphal, 1994: 121).  However, stock 
options as a governance mechanism are associated with organizational costs, thus creating a cost-
benefit trade-off for the IPO firm. 
Studies based on U.S. IPOs demonstrate that U.S. investors look favorably upon IPO 
firms that offer options to their executives (Sanders and Boivie, 2004; Certo, Daily, Cannella, 
and Dalton, 2003).  In fact, in the U.S. stock-based executive compensation is so prevalent 
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(Coombes et al., 2001) that it has  achieved “taken for granted status” (Sanders and Boivie, 
2004: 171) among financial and business community members in the U.S. From an agency 
perspective, it would appear that U.S. investors place greater reliance on this monetary measure 
as the preferred incentive alignment mechanism.  Studies comparing executive compensation in 
the U.S. and U.K. have found that the sensitivity of executive compensation to increases in 
shareholder wealth are much greater in the U.S. than in the U.K. with the difference largely 
attributable to greater share option awards in the U.S. (Conyon and Murphy, 2000).  Its explicit 
nature, favorable tax treatment under the U.S. accounting rules, its assumption that managers are 
individuals solely motivated by self interest and extrinsic rewards, and the non-egalitarian ethos 
of the U.S. make stock options a very appealing incentive system in the U.S. in the eyes of the 
shareholders.  In light of the greater acceptance of stock options in the U.S. capital market, we 
expect that foreign firms that use this type of incentive mechanism would find a higher degree of 
institutional conformity when listing in the U.S.   
Outside the U.S. institutional context, executive share options often contradict prevailing 
culture, contingencies, and coalitions of interest (Buck and Shahrim, 2005).  When investors rely 
on reputational considerations rather than formal equity-based incentives in evaluating the 
probability of self-serving behavior of managers, presence of executive share options would have 
relatively lower weight in terms of the firm’s expected cost of capital.  
In the U.K., there is a considerable public debate with regard to incentive properties of 
executive share options.  Over the late 1980s and early 1990s, the levels of executive pay were 
felt by many to have increased dramatically and unjustifiably (Smith et al., 1995).  The general 
consensus has been that U.K. regulations have done little to address the issue of executive pay in 
detail.  Instead, the main focus has been on disclosure and transparency.  Despite disappointment 
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expressed by prominent investor groups (such as the National Association of Pension Funds and 
the Association of British Insurers) there appears to be a lack of normative pressure to change 
existing executive pay structures in the U.K.  More to the point, in their study of executive 
compensation in the UK IPO firms, Allcock and Filatotchev (2009) indicate that less than half 
the firms had executive share option plans with some form of performance criteria attached, and 
that a large proportion of firms did not have any executive compensation schemes at all. 
These arguments lead us to hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 2:  Foreign IPOs with executive stock options are more likely to list in 
the U.S. 
 
Board Independence 
 
Board independence is often viewed as a positive sign that management will have more 
transparent and professional monitoring of its operations.  Independent boards that possess a 
diverse set of skills and experiences are considered important to investors (Useem, Bowman, 
Myatt, and Irvine; 1993) because it implies the firm will be better governed and capable of 
attaining higher performance levels (Millestein and MacAvoy, 1998).  A recent study by Gillan 
and Starks (2003) suggests that board practices are considered as important as financial 
performance among the institutional investors they surveyed.  In fact, a majority of respondents 
revealed that a well governed firm would prompt them to pay a premium over a comparable firm 
that had lower governance measures.   
An independent board may signal a governance structure which U.S. investors expect 
when evaluating unfamiliar firms.  Coffee (2002) suggests that foreign firms that engage in the 
process of listing on U.S. stock exchanges commit themselves to respect minority investor rights 
and to provide fuller disclosure.  Board independence may suggest to potential investors that the 
firm is attempting to increase its level of transparency and monitoring by adhering to a more 
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demanding corporate governance system than the accepted model espoused in its home market.  
The SEC makes it a regulatory requirement for publicly listed firms in the U.S to have 
independent boards and key board committees to be constituted of independent members.  By 
demonstrating their willingness to adhere to heightened governance standards imposed by the 
U.S. regulatory environment, investors will be more willing to respond with increased demand 
for the new issue.  
However, from the governance cost-benefit trade-off perspective, independent boards 
increase costs of governance, starting with the systemic costs of compliance that are reflected in 
the firm’s balance sheet and other accounting documentation (e.g. independent directors, fees or 
directors’ insurance).  In addition, independent boards impose less explicit opportunity costs on 
executive directors (e.g. directors’ time spent on governance issues instead of business strategy 
or changes in managerial risk preferences).  Since these costs may be quite significant to IPO 
firms, they may select institutional environments which allow them a certain degree of flexibility 
in addressing this governance factor.  The “comply-or-explain” regulatory approach in the U.K. 
provides an opportunity to avoid regulatory pressures of compliance, especially in the more 
lightly regulated and the most popular stock exchange in London, the AIM stock market.  
Finally, while independent directors provide much of the traditional monitoring role of firms in 
the U.S., scholars suggest that nominated advisors (“Nomads”) provide much of the monitoring 
role among those firms listing on AIM (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 1998).  Taken together, these 
arguments suggest that the salience of board independence in the U.K. will be lower than in the 
U.S. 
Therefore,  
Hypothesis 3:  Foreign IPOs with independent boards are more likely to list in the 
U.S. 
 19 
 
Legitimation through External Ties 
Firms undertaking IPOs in foreign markets face problems associated with liability of 
foreignness and therefore undertake measures to reduce such liability.  One approach would be 
certification through associations with third parties such as prestigious underwriting or venture 
capital firms who enjoy credibility in that market.  Board interlocks also play a role similar to 
third party certification in that they represent the ties that the firm has to other firms that are well 
established.  Accordingly, in this section, we develop hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between capital market choice and the legitimacy of these three types of external ties in the U.S. 
and U.K. capital markets. 
Prestigious Underwriters 
 Given the perceptions of uncertainty surrounding a new issue, endorsements by 
influential third parties are generally considered important due to their detailed knowledge about 
a firm’s present financial position, as well as their assessment of its future viability.  Developing 
ties with prominent partners can signal quality to key external resource holders and lead to 
performance benefits for those firms engaged in the IPO process.  There is a range of essential 
criteria for third-party certification to be considered a credible signal by potential investors.  
Among them, researchers suggest the certifying party must have reputation capital at stake and it 
must be costly for the issuing firm to contract the services of the certifying party (Booth and 
Smith, 1986; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Hansen and Torregrosa, 1992).  However, the 
reputational value of endorsements by third parties may not carry the same weight across all 
institutional contexts.  Socio-political legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Hannan and Carroll, 
1992) is conferred by the endorsement of legal authorities, government bodies, or other powerful 
organizations and is associated with increased access to resources and greater rewards.  As Rao 
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(1994) notes “the very act of endorsement embeds an organization in a status hierarchy and 
thereby builds the reputation of an organization” (Rao, 1994, p. 31).  Therefore, a relationship 
with a high-status partner can be considered a powerful endorsement for the unfamiliar firm and 
thus act as a reputational source of legitimacy (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Podolny, 1994).   
 The role of the well established and recognized underwriters to the success of IPOs has 
been highlighted in a large number of studies (Booth and Smith, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 
1990; Hansen and Torregrosa, 1992; Carter, Dark and Singh, 1998; Jain and Kini, 1999; 
Loughran and Ritter, 2004).  In their efforts to offset the costs of securing a prestigious 
underwriter, we contend that foreign IPOs consider the differential salience of underwriter 
signals in the U.S. and U.K. capital markets.  Prestigious underwriters are headquartered in the 
U.S., but they operate globally, including the London exchanges.  They are relevant social actors 
and can confer legitimacy to foreign IPOs, but their power to do so may vary between the U.S. 
and U.K. capital markets.  For example, Pollock, Porac and Wade (2004: 68) suggest, “formal 
regulatory institutions (e.g., governmental agencies, industry associations and boards of conduct, 
etc.) often have a significant impact on the way brokers design and manage deal networks.”  In 
the U.S., prestigious underwriters must not only adhere to the SEC requirements, they must also 
construct arm’s length, market-based contractual arrangements rather than close, embedded ties 
(Uzzi 1996, 1997) to manage their relationships with other IPO deal members.  
In the U.K., the AIM market can be considered a “reputational market,” in which 
investors rely on the standing of nomads as a proxy for the quality of listed companies, rather 
than on the market’s regulation (Davidoff, 2007).  Here nomads serve as gatekeepers, advisers, 
and regulators of AIM-listed companies (The Combined Code, 2006).   These firms also perform 
an on-ongoing post-listing role to ensure the transparency of the listed firms operations, and 
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ensure market awareness of “of all information that needs to be in the public domain,” to 
determine which information merits disclosure (Aaronson, 2007: 29).  The vast majority of 
nomads are lower and medium-tier investment banks who maintain a network of exclusive 
clients mostly within the City of London such as investment funds and individual investors.  
Rules regulating nomads are much more relaxed compared to the U.S. rules surrounding the 
practices of investment banks, and the whole industry is mainly driven by informal networks and 
reputational concerns (Davidoff, 2007).  Should nomads fail to perform their monitoring role 
after the firm goes public, they risk the loss of reputational capital and be subject to penalties2.  
When an IPO firm approaches an underwriter, it also engages in a complex process of 
balancing costs and benefits that this underwriter may generate in a particular market.  Although 
evidence suggests that underwriters in the U.S. tend to use more expensive “book building 
techniques” in pricing IPOs while European underwriters oftentimes use a variety of lower-
priced techniques including auctions or fixed-priced offers, top U.S. underwriters provide a 
wider analyst coverage that may boost IPO performance (Ritter, 2003).  More specifically, 
although a reputable U.S. underwriter may be more costly, it would create substantial 
“certification” benefits and analyst coverage if the firm lists in the U.S. Alternatively, if the 
foreign IPO firm has chosen a less prestigious underwriter, it is likely seeking to minimize IPO 
related costs while taking advantage of the network economy of the City.  Hence,  
Hypothesis 4:  Foreign IPOs with more prestigious underwriters are more likely 
to list in the U.S. 
 
Venture Capital Syndicates 
                                                 
2
 For example, the nomad Blue Oar recently received disciplinary action for failing to act with due care and skill and 
for impairing the reputation and integrity of AIM through its conduct or judgment (London Stock Exchange AIM 
Disciplinary Notice, June 2009). 
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  In addition to the formal reputation based on socio-political legitimacy, an important 
dimension of legitimacy is cognitive legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Hannan and Carroll, 
1992).  This type of legitimacy arises from the development of an informal type of reputation 
that is embedded in social networks with strong ties.  IPO studies have increasingly recognized 
that among large-block investors, venture capitalists may have a particularly strong reputational 
effect because of their early involvement in the strategic development of the fast-growing firm 
(Carpenter et al., 2003).  They possess detailed knowledge and substantial decision-making 
rights in firms that they finance (Lerner, 1995).  In particular, VC firms impose contractual 
restraints on managerial discretion, including the use of staged investment, an enforceable nexus 
of security covenants, and the option to replace the entrepreneur as manager unless key 
investment objectives are met (see Megginson and Weiss, 1991, for a discussion).   
In addition to the monitoring and control roles of VCs, some researchers focus on their 
resource and strategy contributions.  One way of dealing with the uncertainties associated with 
risky IPOs is to syndicate the investment.  Syndication is a means by which VCs can share risk 
through portfolio diversification since for a given fund size it enables the spreading of capital 
across a greater number of investments (Cumming, 2003).  In addition, by syndicating deals, VC 
firms are able to increase the portfolio they can optimally manage through resource sharing 
(Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2000).  VC firms can access more information by syndicating with 
other reputable VC firms.  In specialist areas, VC firms may seek to syndicate with specialist 
VCs or venture funds managed by industrial partners (e.g., Intel Ventures).  These industrial 
partners may have more specialist knowledge than either the VC firm itself or other VCs.  This 
knowledge can be important in evaluating the initial investment, in post-investment 
management, and in providing an eventual exit route.  However, previous studies did not 
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consider potential differences in terms of the effects of VC syndicates on IPO performance in 
different institutional context. 
We build on research by Pollock (2004) who points out that the primary market for IPOs 
is an interesting example of a mediated market.  In mediated markets, the social capital of a 
broker can significantly shape market outcomes.  Venture capital syndicates typically possess 
higher amounts of social capital related to their informal networks that include various 
stakeholders, such as financiers, political actors, IPO advisors, and VCs.  Within an institutional 
framework the role of a VC syndicate can be related to the IPO firm’s cognitive legitimacy, e.g., 
an organization is considered appropriate within a widely shared system of norms and values 
(Zucker, 1986).  This type of legitimacy provides for the development of an informal type of 
reputation that is embedded in social networks with strong ties.  Network embeddedness 
provides a structural and/or relational safeguard against opportunistic behavior, because of the 
effects a negative reputation can have on future relations (e.g., Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer, 2000; 
Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti, 1997).  Prior research has indicated that the closeness and trust 
existing between actors serves as a social lubricant for ongoing interactions such that critical 
transaction-specific informational resources can be of acceptable availability and quality 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).  Furthermore, these types of networks reduce requisite 
safeguarding/monitoring of transactional assets and provide informal, socially-based 
mechanisms that govern firm behavior (Uzzi, 1996; 1997).   
We expect these specific attributes of VC syndicates will be isomorphic and valued 
higher within the City of London’s network economy.  In other words, network-based 
gentlemanly capitalism in the UK should increase positive impact of venture capital syndicate 
backing on the IPO firm’s attempts to reduce its cost of capital by instilling a notion of trust, 
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mutual dependence and reputational concerns within a VC syndicate.  A close geographical 
proximity of VCs in the U.K. and dense informal network links also provides a mechanism for 
arbitration between the potentially diverse objectives of syndicate partners (Robbie, Wright and 
Chiplin, 1997) mitigating therefore anticipated conflicts of interest within a syndicate. 
 Hence,  
 Hypothesis 5: Foreign IPOs with syndicated venture capital investors are more 
likely to list in the U.K. 
 
Board Interlocks 
  Our previous arguments focused on the monitoring and control aspects of corporate 
governance and their impact on agency costs associated with foreign IPOs.  The resource 
dependence and strategic change perspectives suggest that corporate governance factors may also 
play resource and strategic roles in the decision-making process (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). More 
specifically, strategy research emphasizes the importance of the board’s service and strategic roles 
when the firm faces a highly uncertain environment (Daily and Dalton, 1994; Chaganti et al., 
1985). In particular, the links that non-executive directors have with a firm’s environment can 
prove to be useful in obtaining financial resources needed for growth, restructuring expertise, and 
establishing relationships with a variety of stakeholders (Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce and Zahra, 1991; 
Provan, 1980).  These links are directly related to board ties measured in terms of the number of 
outside directorships (‘interlocks’) each individual board member holds in other organizations both 
within the industry and outside (Dalton et al., 1998; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; Pfeffer, 1972). 
Companies with greater growth opportunities are expected to gain most by having their directors 
serve on the boards of other companies (Beatty and Zajac, 1994).  
 Foreign IPOs led by board members with a large number of external board memberships 
may be particularly beneficial in the U.K. capital market due to the relatively more important 
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roles that informal networks play in the City of London.  Investors in the U.K. market look to 
firms with boards who possess extensive interlocks not only as a resource, but also as a 
mechanism to gain legitimacy and acceptance among investors.  Rao et al. (2000) indicates that 
board interlocks may serve as an infrastructure for cohesion and as a mechanism enabling the 
communication and transfer of norms and values.  
 In the U.S., board interlocks may have less salience because of the regulatory focus on 
monitoring and control functions of independent directors.  More specifically, the absolute 
number of directors and their external directorships may provide even a negative effect on 
investors’ assessment of firm quality.  This is linked to investors’ evaluation of board efficiency 
in relation to the board size and external links of directors, suggesting that beyond a certain 
threshold, these factors can compromise directors’ effectiveness and time they can allocate to the 
focal firm (Daily et al., 1999; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). 
We contend that due to the U.S. market’s reliance upon arm’s length market transactions 
compared to informal institutions governing the U.K. capital market, board interlocks may be 
more salient in the U.K.  Indeed, foreign IPOs with enhanced board interlocks will achieve 
greater fit with institutional environments characterized by network embeddedness.  Hence, we 
suggest:  
Hypothesis 6:  Foreign IPOs with more intensive board “interlocks” are more 
likely to list in the U.K. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Sample Selection 
 Our study focuses exclusively on foreign issuers which are not listed on any exchange, 
including their home country, prior to their U.S. or U.K. initial public offer.  Consistent with a 
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number of studies focusing on this unique population of firms (Bell, Moore, and Al-Shammari, 
2008; Bruner, Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2006; Kadiyala and Subrahmanyam, 2002; Ejara, 
Ghosh, and Nunn, 1999) we used Thomson Financial’s Security Data Corporation (SDC) New 
Issues database to identify all foreign firms that made initial public offerings in the U.S and U.K. 
markets between 2002 and 2006.  We classified “foreign” in both the U.S. and U.K samples to 
be those companies incorporated and whose primary executive offices are located outside of the 
U.S., for the U.S. sample, and outside the U.K. for the U.K. sample.  We excluded from the 
sample firms whose stock listings resulted from mergers or acquisitions or spin-offs of publicly-
listed firms in addition to units, warrants, and rights offerings.  We also followed selection 
procedures outlined by Bruner et al., (2006) by removing all new issues of foreign utility firms 
from consideration.  Finally, we eliminated from consideration U.S. or U.K. financial service 
firms incorporated in Bermuda, Bahamas, and Cayman Islands as these firms often choose to 
incorporate in these countries for tax purposes alone.  After identifying the sample of foreign 
IPOs made on U.S. and U.K. exchanges between 2002 and 2006, we referred to each offering 
firm’s prospectus to acquire our governance and control variables.  We selected the period after 
introduction of SOX in the U.S. because it marked growing differences in regulatory approaches 
to corporate governance in the U.K. and U.S. Our final sample includes 103 and 99 foreign IPOs 
in the U.S. and U.K., respectively. 
Measures 
Dependent Variable 
 Our research question is aimed at identifying those factors that predict the likelihood that 
a firm will choose the U.S. or U.K. exchange for their initial public offering.  Therefore, the 
dependent variable in our study is binary: whether a foreign firm makes their IPO on the U.S. or 
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U.K. exchanges between 2002 and 2006.  We coded foreign IPOs listed on U.S. exchanges as 1 
and U.K. listed foreign IPOs as 0. 
Independent Variables   
 Founder/CEO was a dummy variable coded 1 if one of the original founders of a 
company was the CEO at the time the company went public.  Executive Stock Options was 
dummy coded as 1 if stock options were offered to the CEO prior to the firm’s IPO (Certo et. al. 
2003; Beatty and Zajac, 1994).  We measured Board Independence as the percentage of 
independent directors each firm had at IPO (Carpenter et al., 2003; Certo et al., 2001) as 
identified in the offering prospectuses.  We measured Board Interlocks as the sum of the 
directorships of all board members (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002).  Underwriter Prestige was 
measured based on the ratings assigned to the underwriters by Carter and Manaster (1990) and 
Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) after the modifications suggested by Loughran and Ritter (2004).  
Finally, we measured Venture Capital Syndication by number of venture capital firms involved 
in an IPO.  We identified the presence of VC backing by first referencing the “Principal 
Stockholders” section of each prospectus and then verifying those VCs we identified against 
“The Venture One Venture Capital Source Book” to ensure the shareholder was indeed a venture 
capital firm.   
Control Variables 
 To account for the different size and scale of firms likely to list on U.S. exchanges 
(NYSE and NASDAQ) and the U.K. exchanges (LSE and AIM) we controlled for a host of firm 
characteristics.  We controlled for the effects of firm age by taking the difference in years 
between the IPO firm’s founding date and the date of the IPO (Daily, Certo, and Dalton, 2005).  
We also controlled for organizational size and issue size.  We measured firm size as the revenues 
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at the time of IPO and IPO size as the total proceeds from the initial public offering less fees and 
expenses associated with the underwriter, investment bank, and auditor (Sanders and Boivie, 
2004).  We expect that larger and older IPOs would prefer to list in the U.S. because of relatively 
larger size of the U.S. stock market. 
 Although not directly related to our theoretical framework, we also controlled for certain 
leadership, ownership, and firm characteristics that previous studies have identified to be 
generally associated with U.S. IPOs.  Despite arguments against CEOs holding dual roles as 
chief executive and board president (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Ramaswamy, Li and Petitt, 2004), 
as many as 80% of Fortune 500 firms have CEO serving as chairman (Rechner and Dalton, 
1991).  To account for this we coded the CEO duality variables as 1 if the CEO held dual 
positions and 0 otherwise.  Similar to CEO duality, blockholder sell-off is characteristic of the 
short-term orientation of U.S. capital markets (Pound 1988; Stiglitz 1985).  We identified 
blockholder sell-off as the percentage change in blockholder shares on the day of the IPO.  
Finally, previous studies have suggested that knowledge-intensive, innovative firms are more 
likely to favor the U.S. over their domestic capital market (Hursti and Maula, 2007; Pagano et 
al., 2002; Blass and Yafeh, 2001).  The first of our two measures to account for this is a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether the IPO operates in a High-Tech industry or not (Daily 
et al., 2005).  Firms operating in high technology industry sectors were coded as 1, while those in 
low-technology industry sectors were coded as 0.  In addition, we controlled for the total number 
of Patents which were awarded to each firm prior to IPO.  
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 We tested our hypotheses using the logistic regression model (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 
2000) and general estimating equations.  Logistic regression allowed us to assess how well our 
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set of predictor variables explains a firm’s decision to list on the U.S. versus U.K. stock 
exchanges based on the sign of beta coefficients associated with a particular independent 
variable.  We coded IPOs that listed in the U.S. as 1 and U.K. IPOs as 0.  Consequently, a 
positive (+) coefficient suggests the independent variable is predictive of U.S. IPOs, while a 
negative (-) coefficient is interpreted as being predictive of U.K. IPOs.  Logistic regression also 
provides an indication of the relative importance of each predictor variable as well as the 
model’s accuracy of classifying observations.  Although logistic regression does not make 
assumptions concerning the distribution of scores for the predictor variables, it is sensitive to 
multicollinearity and outliers (Wright, 1995).   
 Table 1 contains descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in the study.  
The Revenues Prior to the IPO, CEO Duality, and Executive Stock Options variables were 
strongly correlated with VC Syndication.  While there is no formal way to test for 
multicollinearity in logistic regression, the bivariate correlations between independent variables 
are well below the 0.85 rule of thumb (Leahy, 2000).  We ran models with all possible 
combinations of the variables with high levels of correlation with VC Syndication and found no 
significant change in size of beta coefficients and no changes in signs or significances.  Finally, 
we inspected the residuals for evidence of outliers.  We had one observation with a high residual 
(-3.343).  Since this observation had no substantive effect on the model results when removed 
from the dataset, we retained it in the final analysis. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
In order to test our hypotheses, we examined the beta coefficients and odds ratios for 
individual variables.  The betas presented in Table 2 are the values that would be used in an 
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equation to calculate the probability of a case falling into a specific category.  Thus, a positive 
beta represents a factor that increases the likelihood of a foreign firm making its IPO in the U.S., 
while a negative beta represents a factor that increases the likelihood of listing in the U.K.  
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), the odds ratio represents “the change in odds of 
being in one of the categories of outcome when the value of a predictor increases by one unit” (p. 
461), all other factors equal.  For odds ratios that are less than 1 and accompany a negative beta, 
we have inverted the odds ratio to aid interpretation.   
Model 1 in Table 2 presents the results of the logistic regression with our control 
variables.  Model 1 suggests that larger firms, based on firm revenues are more like to list in the 
U.S. (β= 0.0001, p<.01).  Also, CEO duality (β=1.671, p<0.001) and high tech industries 
(β=4.341, p<0.05) tend to choose U.S. markets.  In fact, firms operating in high tech industries 
are 89.1 times more likely to list in the U.S. Alternatively, we found that blockholder sell-off 
(β=-0.023, p<0.01) and to a moderate extent those firms with high levels of patents (β=-0.018, 
p<0.10) were associated with a U.K. listing. 
 Model 2, the full unrestricted model, in which we entered the control variables and our 
hypothesized variables, demonstrates effective classification of U.S. and U.K. IPOs based on our 
independent variables.  The model significantly predicts market choice for the IPOs in our 
sample (chi-square =230.784, p<0.001) with a percentage accuracy in classification (PAC) of 
97.8%.  Furthermore, the variables included in the model accurately identify characteristic of 
U.S. listings (sensitivity = 98.0%) and U.K. listings (specificity=97.6%), resulting in a 
Percentage Accuracy Classification score of 97.8%. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
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We found support for H1 based on our results that firms with a founder/CEO were more 
likely to file IPOs in the U.K. (β=-2.555, p<0.05).  We found support for H2, which argued that 
executive stock options would be associated with U.S. IPOs (β=10.501, p<0.01).  The odds a 
firm that provides CEO stock options will list in the U.S. are 363.50 times higher than firms 
without CEO stock options.  Given the non-significant Beta for Board Independence, we failed 
to find  support for H3, which argued that higher levels of  board independence would be 
associated with U.S. IPOs 
Our results show that the use of prestigious underwriters would be associated with IPOs 
that list in the U.S. (β=1.081, p<0.001), in line with H4.  In fact, we find for every one unit 
increase in underwriter’s rankings, the odds of listing in the U.S. increase by a factor of 2.9.  We 
also found support for H5 which argued that international VC backing would be associated with 
U.K. IPOs (β=-.546, p<0.05).  By taking the inverse of the odds ratio for the international VC 
variable, we find the odds of a firm with international venture capital backing will list in the U.K. 
are 1.72 (1/0.016 = 62.5) times higher than listing in the U.S.  Finally, the empirical results 
provide support for H6, which argued that board interlocks characterize IPOs listed on U.K. 
exchanges (β=-1.715, p<0.01).  By taking the inverse of the odds ratio for board interlocks, the 
results suggest that for each interlock a board member adds the odds of a firm making their 
initial public offering in the U.K. increases by a factor of 5.5 (1/0.180 = 5.5).   
DISCUSSION 
 Historically, firms were, by and large, confined by legal reasons to offer their shares only 
on the exchanges of their country of origin.  However, decreased regulation along with increased 
competition for financing sources has prompted firms from foreign countries to bypass domestic 
exchanges and look to the financial markets of the U.S. and the U.K.  The fact that in 2007, 
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foreign initial public offers in the U.S. raised $48.2 billion, equating to 30% of all IPO proceeds 
in the U.S. (Thompson Financial) and non-British companies raised $37 billion through IPOs on 
the London exchange suggests that firms from different parts of the world are increasingly 
foregoing their domestic capital markets and accessing foreign markets.  The makeup of these 
firms seeking new sources of equity financing suggests that these firms range from the mature 
and well established, to entrepreneurial ventures seeking to establish themselves.  In addition to 
wide variances in age and size, these foreign firms differ with regard to investor familiarity.  Yet, 
despite these differences, each of these firms attempting equity listings in western capital 
markets are all trying to appeal to investors and maximize the value of their new issue while 
simultaneously minimizing the costs they incur in the IPO process.  
 The literature in international business has long recognized that firms experience costs of 
doing business abroad that are not experienced by local firms (Hymer, 1976).  Apart from the 
market-driven economic costs, firms incur social costs of access and acceptance (Zaheer, 2002) 
when attempting to do business in a foreign country.  These social costs of being a “stranger in a 
strange land” are usually referred to as liability of foreignness and arise because of unfamiliarity 
hazards, discrimination hazards, and relational hazards (Eden and Miller, 2004).  In the case of 
firms undertaking their IPO in foreign stock exchanges, the liability of foreignness is 
compounded by the “liability of newness.”  Analogous to the arguments of Sanders and Boivie 
(2004) in the context of IPOs in emerging industries, investors and analysts lack a codified body 
of knowledge and country-specific experience that are necessary for a systematic evaluation of 
foreign IPO firms.  Although the concepts of liability of foreignness and liability of newness 
were developed in the context of product markets, they are considerably more salient in the case 
of firms competing in foreign capital markets due to the well documented existence of “home-
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bias” within financial markets.  “Home bias” refers the tendency among investors to often 
neglect the portfolio benefits associated with international diversification and allocate a 
relatively large fraction of their wealth in domestic equities (Grubel, 1968; Levy and Sarnat, 
1970; Solnik, 1974; Grauer and Hakansson, 1987; Eldor, Pines, and Schwartz, 1988; DeSantis 
and Gerard 1997).   
 Our research suggests that, given that foreign new issues are fully aware of the problems 
associated with liabilities of foreignness and newness, their efforts will be focused on 
overcoming these liabilities and making their IPO a success.  Legitimate status is especially 
important to young firms entering a market by enhancing an emerging organization’s chance of 
survival (Aldrich and Fiol, 1995; Rao, 1994) and we show that it is especially salient for firms 
attempting to acquire resources in foreign financial markets given problems associated with 
information asymmetries, liabilities of foreignness and liabilities of newness.  In this paper, we 
identify how internal and extra-organizational building blocks of IPO legitimacy may be quite 
different between the U.S. and U.K. capital markets.   
 Our paper makes several important contributions to the literature on institutional 
differences in general and to the growing body of studies on governance and IPOs in the 
management area in particular.  The increasing globalization of capital markets makes the choice 
of capital markets an important area of study for strategy scholars.  However, to the best of our 
knowledge, no prior studies have examined how foreign firms can distinguish between the U.S. 
and U.K. capital markets and make informed strategic choices regarding the placement of their 
first public equity offers.  To that extent, we believe our study can serve as a point of departure 
for future studies of capital market choices, and institutional influences on the capital market 
strategies of firms.  Second, the results of our study demonstrate that the salience of governance 
 34 
signals can vary significantly even between two common law countries.  We attribute such 
variance to differences in institutional environments and suggest that these institutional 
differences can be more subtle and more nuanced than generally assumed.  However, the 
differences between the regulatory environments of U.S. and U.K. capital markets become most 
observable when foreign firms attempt to exploit the capital market resources of these two 
markets.  Indeed, by focusing on the disparities between the regulatory institutions of the U.S. 
and U.K. our study adds to the manner in which we may evaluate formal and informal 
institutions (North, 1990; Glaeser, La Porta, Silanes and Shleifer, 2004; Vatn, 2005; Fergusson, 
2006).  A country’s regulatory institutions are considered the easiest for foreign firms to observe 
and adhere to (Eden and Miller, 2004) simply because rules and procedures are frequently 
codified.  On the other hand, our study suggests, comparisons of governance regulations across 
countries may inadequately account for the informal and normative nature of some regulative 
institutional environments.  While the Combined Code does present an outward display of 
codified rules of governance policies, there is considerably less distinction between regulative 
and normative institutions found in the “gentlemanly capitalism” practices of the U.K. capital 
market.  
 In terms of implications for managerial practice, our analysis suggests that managers of 
foreign private firms contemplating their first equity offers should critically assess the value of 
their governance and third party signals prior to engaging in the lengthy and costly new issue 
process.  Indeed, institutional differences in the U.S. and U.K. capital markets can have 
significant performance implications for threshold firms.  Foreign firms who choose to list in 
markets where their governance and third party signals do not conform to the institutional 
environment of the market they choose run the risk of underperforming at IPO. 
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LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 While interpreting the results of our study, it is important to bear in mind some of its 
limitations.  First, despite the prominence of the New York and London, firms are not restricted 
to the exchanges of these two markets.  Indeed, today firms can choose to raise equity capital on 
the exchanges of a number of prominent markets such Hong Kong, Singapore, Tokyo and 
Toronto and from regional exchanges such as Dubai.  Finally, our data is limited to the 
information that can be garnered from the prospectuses of these firms.  There may be factors that 
are not required to be revealed in the prospectus that may also have a bearing on the choice.  
Relying heavily on the prospectus highlights the cross sectional design of the study, thereby 
raising considerable caution in making inferences of causality.  The prospectus also limits our 
ability to examine the process of strategic decision making by the firms in our sample because 
we cannot examine how the process unfolds over time.  Therefore, given that strategic capital 
market choices unfold over time and are subject to a number of formal and informal influences, 
we believe richer insights can be developed about the content of these decisions by studying the 
underlying processes.  These limitations notwithstanding, we believe that the high explanatory 
power of our model and the resultant correct classifications suggest that our model is well 
specified. 
 There are a number of promising directions in which the future study of capital market 
choices can be extended.  First, given that our study focused on choice between two common law 
countries, it would be interesting to investigate the factors that influence the choice between 
common law and civil law countries.  Additionally, investigating the interdependent nature of 
signals surrounding a new issue may provide rich new insights about the behavior of firms and 
capital markets.  Indeed, certain combinations of signals may be quite necessary in certain 
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institutional contexts, while less salient in others.  Finally, examining the performance 
consequences of the capital market choices will be helpful to practicing managers who bear the 
responsibility to make this crucial choice.  
CONCLUSION 
 The results of our study suggest that foreign firms contemplating a new equity offer 
would tend to select a host market in which there is a “fit” between its characteristics and 
existing affiliations and the host market’s institutional environment.  The basis for evaluating 
such fit with a host country’s financial markets is the extent to which firm attributes and 
characteristics meet legitimacy standards in host markets.  However, the value placed by 
investors on specific firm attributes are likely to vary from one market to another because the 
norms and expectations of host market participants are, to a great extent, shaped by the 
institutional context of that country.  Given the differences in institutional contexts between the 
U.S. and U.K. regulative environments, our research indicates that the value of specific internal 
governance characteristic and external ties will vary from one location to another.  
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
 
 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Firm Age at IPO 7.959 9.176
2 Revenues  $292M  $ 1.12B -0.008
3 Ship Or Mine 0.069 0.255 -0.134 * -0.019
4 High Tech 0.441 0.497 0.007 0.079 -0.203 **
5 Firm Risk 31.936 17.868 -0.103 0.122 0.095 0.134 **
6 Underwriter Prestige 5.36 3.700 -0.034 0.055 0.054 0.040 0.391 **
7 Board Size 6.762 2.193 0.071 -0.025 -0.185 ** 0.101 0.276 ** 0.265 I**
8 TMT Size 6.03 2.949 0.040 -0.073 -0.089 0.325 ** 0.063 0.256 ** 0.345 **
9 International Assets 0.178 0.348 -0.041 0.095 0.086 -0.212 ** -0.125 0.009 -0.101 -0.004
10 Emerging Economy 0.38 0.486 -0.006 -0.055 0.029 0.258 ** 0.245 -0.022 0.094 0.058 -0.162
11 Investor Protection 3.266 1.411 0.157 * 0.013 -0.045 -0.072 -0.318 ** -0.193 -0.006 -0.033 0.111 -0.522 **
12 US IPO (Market Choice) 0.510 0.226 0.126 0.031 0.230 ** -0.055 0.157 * 0.302 ** -0.139 ** 0.032 -0.013 -0.068 -0.080
13 Board Independence 0.402 0.226 -0.017 0.069 0.151 * 0.192 ** 0.680 ** 0.434 ** 0.292 ** 0.189 ** -0.170 * 0.332 ** -0.228 0.219 **
14 IPO Success 0.001 0.832 -0.089 0.049 -0.008 0.051 0.099 0.163 * 0.238 ** 0.264 ** -0.035 0.088 -0.144 -0.036 0.209 **
* p < 0.05
** p  <0..01
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TABLE 2 
Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for IPO Stock Market Choice 
† p < 0.10 
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
***p<0.001 
Variable Odds Ratio
Control Variables
Constant -1.694 *** -9.264 * 0.000
Age -0.005 -0.030 0.970
Blockholder Sell Off -0.023 ** -0.022 0.978
Revenues 0.000 ** 0.000 * 1.000
CEO Duality 1.671 *** 6.775 * 875.922
High Tech 4.341 * 4.491 * 89.184
Patents -0.018 † -0.021 † 0.979
Predictors
H1: Founder-CEO -2.555 * 0.578
H2: Executive Stock Options 10.501 ** 363.50        
H3: Board Independence -4.702 0.009
H4: Board Interlocks -1.715 ** 0.180
H5: Underwriter Prestige 1.081 *** 2.946
H6: VC Syndication -0.546 * 0.580
Goodness of F it
Chi-Square 57.841 *** 230.784 ***
Cox & Snell R2 27.1% 71.7%
Nagelkerke R2 36.2% 95.8%
 - 2 Log-likelihood 194.270 21.326
Classification Accuracy
Percentage Accuracy Classification 74.9% 97.8%
Positive Predictive Value (US IPO) 76.0% 98.0%
Negative Predictive Value (UK IPO) 73.5% 97.6%
Model 2Model 1
Beta Coefficients
